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Abstract
This study investigates the asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff in the Eurozone.
Building upon the augmented Okun’s law framework, the relationships between unemploy-
ment and output cannot be correctly specified in the static linear, static asymmetric and dy-
namic linear regressions. By contrast, the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL)
model is well-specified and in this case indicates that the nature of Okun’s law is asymmetric.
For the Eurozone, the NARDL estimates demonstrate that labour markets quickly respond
to cyclical outputs in a short period, while the adjustments towards new equilibrium become
weak in the long run. Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis of long run asymmetries in-
dicates that government spending and trade balance are key factors affecting the asymmetric
unemployment-output tradeoff. Thus, these results seem to suggest that, in spite of the fact
that member states lack monetary sovereignty, flexible application of fiscal reforms or labour
market reforms could help to reduce asymmetric effects.
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1 Introduction
The Eurozone has documented discouraging economic performance since mid-1990s (Chamorel,
2006). Its annual growth rate of gross domestic product (GDP) averaged 1.55% during 1995-
2014, which was comparatively lower than in the US (2.4%) and China (9.55%), as released by
the World Bank. One of the main explanatory factors behind is the persistent hight unemploy-
ment. Unemployment rate in the region reached a peak of 12% in February 2013, while it had
a historical low of 7.2% in March 2008. Compared with other major economies, unemployment
rate is much higher in the euro area in 2013 than in the US (7.4%) and China (4.1%). This
can be attributed to the lack of sufficient structural reforms in the labour market of this region,
which indeed play a vital role in getting people into work. To construct a well-functioning labour
market, labour supply-side policies and tax and benefit system reforms are widely proposed in
the existing literature (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2014), including the
tax and benefit system reforms. In practice, the European Commission and the Economic Pol-
icy Committee (EPC) have jointly launched a LABour market REForm (LABREF) database
project, which allows cross-country analysis on the labour market measures, assists in the re-
form assessment, and enhances recommendations to member states.1 This database becomes a
valuable tool in designing policies that aim to reduce unemployment and boost growth. The
Eurozone economies have implemented labour market reforms in order to minimise the output
gaps between member states, though, the performances of these countries are still having a great
discrepant.2 These discrepancies might be due to the fact that there exists a huge disparity inside
the Eurozone, with member states show big differences among themselves. However, structural
reforms may also produce results different from expected since there might exist asymmetries
in the unemployment-output relationship. The disparities in growth and labour markets might
1LABREF, see the databases and indicators in the economic and financial affairs of the European Commission.
2See the historical statistics of the Eurozone economies via the Eurostat: eceuropa.eu/eurostat.
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suggest that structural reforms should be carried out in light of the nature of the unemployment-
output relationship, since the long run and short run unemployment-output tradeoff could be
asymmetric (Silvapulle et al., 2004; Belaire-Franch and Peiro´, 2014). The existence of these
asymmetries could explain why structural reforms that are effective in the short run might
cause opposite or zero effects in the long run, and similarly, structural reforms which are ex-
pected having positive effects in the long run might cause negative or null effect in the short
run. Consequently, identifying the correct inherent characteristics of the unemployment-output
tradeoff along the whole time horizon is crucial to determine the optimal structural reforms.
The correlation between unemployment and output has been explored intensively in litera-
ture. The remarkable theory is the Okun’s law, which essentially proposes a negative relationship
between the unemployment and real output (Okun, 1962). It relates the level of activities in the
labour market to the level of activities in the goods market over the economic cycle. The Okun’s
law has been widely used as a rule of thumb to estimate the potential output and ascertain the
loss of output caused by the unemployment changes. A vast number of studies investigate the
unemployment-output relationship in a linear framework and assume that the cyclical output
has symmetrical effects on unemployment (Hamada and Kurosaka, 1984; Attfield and Silver-
stone, 1998; Christopoulos, 2004; Gabrisch and Buscher, 2006). However, when the fitness and
stability of the Okun’s law have been revisited and discussed by So¨gner and Stiassny (2002);
Perman and Tavera (2005), there is little evidence showing that the labour market should react
to the business cycle in the symmetric pattern. In response to this issue, researchers are increas-
ingly shifting their interests into the nonlinear modeling of the unemployment-output tradeoff
(Lee, 2000; Harris and Silverstone, 2000; Altissimo and Violante, 2001; Vougas, 2003; Marinkov
and Geldenhuys, 2007).
Precisely, asymmetric unemployment-output relation refers to the changes in output might
cause asymmetric changes in unemployment in the long run and short run, which could be
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positive or negative (ie, above or below the equilibrium relationship) (Harris and Silverstone,
2001; Silvapulle et al., 2004). In the existing regional unemployment-output relationship studies,
the asymmetric effects have been found in the US (Silvapulle et al., 2004), New Zealand (Harris
and Silverstone, 2000), South Africa (Marinkov and Geldenhuys, 2007) and OECD countries
(Lee, 2000; Harris and Silverstone, 2001). There are some research focusing on the European
countries (Perman and Tavera, 2005; Jardin and Stephan, 2010), but they did not test the long
run and short run asymmetric effects in a nonlinear framework.
The objective of this paper is analyzing the asymmetries of the unemployment-output trade-
off in the euro area and identifying the possible determinants of these asymmetric effects. The
interest on this region lies in the fact that it is constituted as a currency union but not as a fiscal
union, which might cause discrepancies across member states in growth and labour market re-
forms. Concerning the research method, the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL)
model has been utilized. The recent developments on this method have proved that it is com-
petent and effective to test both the long run and short run asymmetries, irrespective of the
integration order of the variables (Shin et al., 2014).
This study contributes to the literature mainly in four aspects. First, this paper identifies
the asymmetric effects in the unemployment-output tradeoff in the euro area, which helps to
understand the responsiveness of the activities in the labour markets to the activities in the good
markets. Undeniably, this might play a considerable role in designing labour market reforms,
talking into consideration that the potential asymmetries between unemployment and output
affect the effectiveness of labour market reforms. Second, considering the heterogeneity of the
unemployment-output correlation in this region, this study models the asymmetries separately
for each country. The existence of high heterogeneity across member states suggests that labour
market reforms should be in accordance with the country-specific long run and short run asym-
metries. Third, we calculate the dynamic multipliers to obtain a measure of the cumulative
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effects of asymmetric output shocks on labour markets and thus, to depict the adjustments
of labour markets in the disequilibrium unemployment-output relationship towards new long
run equilibrium. This allows us to observe the impacts of positive and negative output shocks
separately. Fourth, the cross-sectional analysis of asymmetry determinants indicates that gov-
ernment expenditure and trade situation are the key factors affecting the long run asymmetries.
Therefore, these results suggest that, although member states lack the monetary sovereignty,
appropriate application of fiscal reforms could also help to reduce the asymmetric effects.
The remaining parts of this study are organised as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical
literature on the asymmetric unemployment-output relationship. Section 3 describes the econo-
metric methods. The brief discussions of dataset are given in section 4. Section 5 summaries the
results of unemployment-output tradeoff based on the linear and nonlinear framework. Finally,
last section concludes the paper.
2 Asymmetric Unemployment-Output Tradeoff: The Empirical
Literature
The investigation of the unemployment-output tradeoff has important macroeconomic implica-
tions, in particular in determining the growth target. The empirical studies estimate the Okun’s
coefficient which reflects the responsiveness of the level of activities in the labour markets to the
level of activities in the good markets. Thus, the coefficient can be also used to measure the cost
of unemployment owing to the upswing or downswing of the output (Moosa, 1997). In practice,
the stability of the Okun’s coefficient has widely argued. This empirical finding establishes that
the relationship between unemployment and output observed in the short run also remains in
the long run. An earlier study on the relationship between output and employment suggests
that the employment-output relationship is unstable, especially in the short run, which has be-
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come politically unpalatable since it makes the design of policies difficult (Wilson, 1960).3 The
investigation on this issue has been resumed after the postulated inverse unemployment-output
relationship by Okun (1962). The robustness of the unemployment-output correlation has been
evaluated by Lee (2000) using the postwar data for 16 OECD countries. The empirical findings
provide evidence of asymmetric effects and structural breaks around 1970s, which support the
instability of the relationship over time. Similar exercise has been done by So¨gner and Sti-
assny (2002) based on the sample of 15 OECD economies. Using regime-switching approach,
they failed to examine the asymmetries in the unemployment-output relationship. However,
the Bayesian and Kalman filtering methods have identified the existence of structural instabil-
ity caused by the labour demand or supply shocks. Since a common shock to the European
union could cause different macroeconomic consequences across member states due to the het-
erogeneity of their macroeconomic indicators, Perman and Tavera (2005) explore evidence of
the convergence of the Okun’s coefficient in Europe. They find that European countries with
centralised wage bargaining show the evidence of convergence of the Okun’s coefficient both in
the short and medium run.
One possible explanation of the unstable unemployment-output relationship could be the
existence of asymmetric shocks, which shapes this relationship. In response to this issue, the
academic attention is shifting into the asymmetric modelling of the unemployment-output trade-
off. Using the asymmetric dynamic model, Silvapulle et al. (2004) present that the asymmetric
unemployment-output correlation exists using the US postwar economy. The responsiveness
of unemployment to cyclical output is proved to be strong when there is a shock from the
negative output gap, in particular in the short run. The dynamic correlation of the US output-
employment has also been explored by Altissimo and Violante (2001) in a nonlinear VAR model.
The linear specification has been rejected in their study, but the regime dependent model demon-
3Due to lack of attention on this issue, it had not been widely developed, but the Okun’s law was well received
after two years.
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strates that the asymmetries in the shocks were generated from recessions, which could be a
possible interpretation for the divergence of the Okun’s coefficient in the existing literature. In
this vein, the study of Huang and Lin (2006) supports the nonlinear unemployment-output rela-
tionship by implementing the nonlinear inference approach in the US sample. In an asymmetric
approach, Harris and Silverstone (2001) suggest that the short run adjustment of labour markets
to the disequilibrium during the downturn of the economic cycle in the OECD countries (except
Canada), while the existence of long run relationship between unemployment and output has
been rejected in the US and New Zealand. Furthermore, there are some country-specific studies
on the asymmetric unemployment-output correlation. In this regard, Harris and Silverstone
(2000) conclude that the long run and short run correlation between unemployment and output
are asymmetric in New Zealand. The asymmetric effects between cyclical output and cyclical
unemployment in South Africa also have been identified (Marinkov and Geldenhuys, 2007).
The asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff in Europe was empirically argued for the
first time in the study of Jardin and Stephan (2010). They find that the unemployment reacts
to output strongly when the economy is in a downswing, but the response tends to be weakened
when the output reaches the bottom. Zanin and Marra (2012) adopt a penalized regression
spline approach to model the time-varying effects in the unemployment-output correlation. They
suggest that the inverse correlation in some Eurozone economies is spatially heterogeneous and
time-varying, but the asymmetric effects have not been tested in the paper. Hutengs and
Stadtmann (2013) examine the age effect in the unemployment-output tradeoff in the Eurozone.
Their evidence show that the output shock leads to an asymmetric digestion and effect on the
budgets. However, the potential asymmetric effects in the unemployment-output relationship
are not investigated in these studies, which will be empirically explored in this paper. Our study
is filling the gap of investigating asymmetric relationship between unemployment and output in
this region, and further provides new insights into correcting the long run asymmetries.
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3 Econometric Methods
In this section, the theoretical models for the unemployment-output tradeoff representing the
Okun’s law, the econometric approach and robust statistics for testing asymmetries are discussed.
The framework for the unemployment-output relationship is based on the Okun’s law (see,
among others, Okun,1962; Harris and Silverstone, 2001; Silvapulle et al., 2004. The econometric
strategy is mainly based on the nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model.4
General discussions on these models will be presented below.
3.1 The classical unemployment-output tradeoff framework
Unemployment rate and real output are commonly used to analyse the responsiveness of labour
market to the cyclical output. Here, unt and yt designate the country-specific unemployment rate
and the natural logarithm of real GDP, respectively. The standard specification for estimating
the unemployment-output tradeoff has the following form:
∆unt = β∆yt + εt (1)
Where ∆unt is the cyclical unemployment rate, ∆yt is the cyclical real output and εt is an error
term. Parameter β is the Okun’s coefficient. The simple static model represents the relationship
between cyclical unemployment and cyclical output. To further look into the nature of the
unemployment-output tradeoff, we need to test whether the two indicators are cointegrated or
not. Even if the static model captures the long run relationship between unemployment and
output, it is inadequate to account for short run dynamics (Silvapulle et al., 2004).
The long run equilibrium relationship between unt and yt could be examined in the conven-
tional Engle and Granger (EG) cointegration approach (Engle and Granger, 1987). We add the
4For mode details, see the latest discussions about the NARDL (Shin et al., 2014).
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constant and trend into the okun’s law, it can be rewritten as:
unt = α+ β1yt + β2t+ εt (2)
If unt and yt are integrated I(1), the long run cointegration relationship exists when εt ∼ I(0).
The static model is usually weak in investigating the unemployment-output tradeoff since there
is no any consideration for asymmetries.
3.2 The asymmetric dynamic unemployment-output tradeoff model
Given that the existing literature suggests that the unemployment-output relationship might be
asymmetric (Harris and Silverstone, 2000; Altissimo and Violante, 2001; Silvapulle et al., 2004;
Marinkov and Geldenhuys, 2007; Jardin and Stephan, 2010), these papers shed new light on
investigating the asymmetric relationship between the proposed variables. The popular time
series approach for testing asymmetries in all the above studies is the distributed lag model.
Accordingly, following Shin et al. (2014), a nonlinear asymmetric cointegration technique to
test both the long run and short run asymmetries in a coherent way is applied.5 In particular,
the NARDL introduces the short run and long run nonlinearities in the positive and negative
partial sum decompositions of the independent variables. Let’s start with the asymmetric long
run regression of the unemployment-output tradeoff:
unt = β+y+t + β−y−t + ut (3)
5See earlier version of the NARDL model: Shin, Yongcheol, Byungchul Yu, and Matthew Greenwood-Nimmo.
Modelling asymmetric cointegration and dynamic multipliers in an ARDL framework. Mimeo: University of
Leeds, 2009.
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Where yt is decomposed as a k × 1 vector of regressors: yt = y0 + y+t + y−t , y+t and y−t are the
partial sum process of the positive and negative changes in yt.
y+t =
t∑
j=1
∆y+j =
t∑
j=1
max(∆yj , 0), y−t =
t∑
j=1
∆y−j =
t∑
j=1
min(∆yj , 0) (4)
and β+ and β− are the related asymmetric long run parameters. The stationary linear combi-
nation of the partial sum components could be defined as:
zt = β+0 un+t + β−0 un−t + β+1 y+t + β−1 y−t (5)
unt and yt are asymmetrically cointegrated only if zt is stationary. The linear symmetric coin-
tegration can only be obtained when β+0 = β−0 and β+1 = β−1 . Nevertheless, the OLS estimator
results in Equation (3) will be poorly estimated in finite samples, and the hypothesis test cannot
be carried out without removing the serial correlation and endogeneity in the regressors. Thus
we extend Equation (3) into the ARDL(p,q) model:
unt =
p∑
j=1
φjunt−j +
q∑
j=0
(θ+′j y+t−j + θ−
′
j y
−
t−j) + εt (6)
Where φj is the autoregressive parameter, θ+j and θ−j are the asymmetric distributed-lagged
parameters, and εt is the normal i.i.d innovations. The error correction form of equation(6) can
be written as:
∆unt = ρunt−1 + θ+y+t−1 + θ−y−t−1 +
p−1∑
j=1
ϕj∆unt−j +
q−1∑
j=0
(pi+j ∆y+t−j + pi−j ∆y−t−j) + εt (7)
Where ρ, θ+ and θ− are the long run coefficients, pi+ and pi− are the short run coefficients.
β+ = −θ+/ρ and β− = −θ−/ρ are the asymmetric long run parameters. Shin et al. (2014) refer
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to Equation (7) as the NARDL model.
In order to observe the effects of the financial crises, two dummy variables are created for
the 2008 world financial crisis and the euro crisis, respectively. If the date t is equal or greater
than 2008q1, D1 equals 1, otherwise D1 = 0. Likewise, the dummy D2 is set as 1 starting with
2009q4. The two dummy variables will be included in the above models to examine the effects
of the financial crises.
3.3 Bounds testing and asymmetric dynamic multipliers
The NARDL model can be estimated by the OLS, which is said to be superior to the existing
regime-switching models, since the examination of the long run asymmetry is easy to test:
ρ = θ+ = θ− = 0. If the null could be rejected based on the bounds testing approach (Pesaran
et al., 2001), it suggests the existence of long run asymmetry. The NARDL model is valid
regardless of the integration orders of the regressors. The long run and short run symmetries
can be examined by testing θ+ = θ− = 0 and pi+ = pi− = 0 (for all i = 0, ..., q), respectively.
The two symmetry tests are based on the standard Wald tests.
The asymmetric dynamic multiplier effects of one unit change in y+t and y−t individually on
unt can be derived from equation (7). They are defined as:
mh+ =
h∑
j=0
∂ut+j
∂y+t
=
h∑
j=0
λ+j , mh
− =
h∑
j=0
∂ut+j
∂y−t
=
h∑
j=0
λ−j , h = 0, 1, 2... (8)
Where h→∞, mh+ → β+ and mh− → β−, where β+ and β− denote the asymmetric long run
coefficients. The dynamic multipliers represent the transition between the initial equilibrium,
short run disequilibrium after a shock, and the new long run equilibrium. It is a useful tool
for analysing both the asymmetric short run adjustment and the asymmetric long run reaction.
It is also quite helpful in observing the responsiveness of the labour market reforms to cyclical
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output.
3.4 Measuring the asymmetry determinants
Once we have obtained the long run positive and negative asymmetric coefficients, the next step
in the analysis is identifying the main determinants that account for such asymmetries. This
exercise would provide the knowledge that would allow to better design economic policies in
each case. In order to have a measure of the size of the long run asymmetries, we calculate the
difference between positive and negative asymmetric coefficients, denoted by LRasyi .
LRasyi = βˆ+i − βˆ−i , LRasyi = f(X,Y ) (9)
Where βˆ+i and βˆ−i are the estimated long run asymmetric coefficients from Equation (7). X
and Y are the labour market variables and country-level variables (for instance, labour cost, min-
imum wage, tax rate and inflation rate), respectively. We explain the cross-section variation in
the degree of long run asymmetries by fitting multivariate regressions, which could demonstrate
how those macroeconomic indicators affect the asymmetric unemployment-output relationship.6
4 The Data
Unemployment rates are collected from the Eurostat. Real GDP for the Eurozone economies are
available on the Datastream.7 The period of time considered for this study varies across coun-
tries, which depends on the availability of the data set.8 All series have been seasonally adjusted.
Figure 1 represents the unemployment rates and real outputs for the Eurozone economies. In-
tuitively, there might be a negative correlation in the economies of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland,
6In the existing literature, the typically considered factors are labour cost, minimum wage, tax rate, government
spending and foreign trade (Symons and Layard, 1984; Blundell et al., 1987).
7The GDP at market prices and the consumer price index of Spain are obtained from the OECD statistics. The
real GDP is defined as the nominal GDP adjusting for inflation.
8Those countries admitted after 2012 have been excluded from the sample, including Latvia and Lithuania.
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Greece, Italy, Slovenia and Spain. Other countries do not exhibit simple unemployment-output
tradeoffs. For all of the 17 Eurozone countries, the 2008 world financial crisis had severe shocks
to their outputs and unemployment rates. The financial crisis has yielded a decrease in outputs
and a rise in unemployment rates. Nevertheless, the duration of the shocks appear to be quite
different among these countries. For instance, Germany experienced a surged unemployment
rate, which had been cracked down in a short period. While other economies were immersed in
the long term recession.
Insert Figure 1 here.
The Eurozone economies have launched variety of structural reforms in response to the
cyclical outputs. During the recession periods, the priority of reforms in the region is getting
people into work. In order to establish a well-functioning labour markets, structural reforms
on the labour markets are mainly focused on the supply-side measures, such as tax reduction
and increasing benefits, which might give incentives to the unemployed people and encourage
them returning to work. Additionally, the labour market reform (LABREF) database project
managed by the European Commission and the Economic Policy Committee (EPC) provides a
consistent and policy associated representation of different reforms strategies being pursued by
member states.9 Thus, the LABREF database is helpful for member states since it provides a
common space to share and evaluate their labour market reforms.
The commonly selected labour demand and supply factors in the existing literature are
wage, government spending, tax rate and trade (Symons and Layard, 1984; Blundell et al.,
1987). Subject to availability, the data for measuring asymmetry determinants at the macro
level include tax rate, minimum wage (per month), labour cost index, government deficit/surplus
(% of GDP), industrial production index, CPI, imports (% of GDP) and exports (% of GDP).
These variables are available on the Eurostat.
9The LABREF database includes the measures of labour market reforms in the EU dating back to 2000, but this
study will only discuss the reforms of some countries in the euro area.
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5 Empirical Analysis and Results
This section discusses the static and dynamic estimates of the unemployment-output tradeoff
in the Eurozone. In order to be consistent with the conventional framework for estimating
the unemployment-output relationship, this study starts with the static linear and asymmetric
estimates, which are carried out using the Engle-Granger (EG) two-step cointegration approach.
To further construct a reference point, the dynamic linear modelling of the unemployment-output
tradeoff is represented. Further, the nonlinear asymmetric distributed lag approach is applied to
test the correlation between unemployment and output. Finally, the cross-sectional analysis of
asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff determinants is carried out to explain the variations
in the long run asymmetries.
5.1 Static Estimation of the Unemployment-Output Tradeoff
Table 1 and Table 2 report the static linear and asymmetric estimates of the unemployment-
output tradeoff, respectively. A deterministic time trend has been included in each single re-
gression to remove the trending behaviour of unemployment rate (unt). The cointegration test
of the unemployment-output relationship is based on the EG-two step cointegration method. In
Table 1, majority of those statistics are statistically significant at the 5% level, but severe serial
correlation and ARCH effects exist in the residuals. The static linear estimates represent that
the world financial crisis in 2008 and the euro crisis in late 2009 have significant impacts on the
responsiveness of the unemployment to the changes in output, except in Malta, which could be
due to its economic particularities in this region. Though EG residual-based Augmented Dickey
Fuller (ADF) test indicates that there is a long run equilibrium linkage between unemployment
and output in Austria, Greece, Malta, Netherland, Slovakia and Slovenia. These models are
not correctly specified as indicated by the diagnostic tests. This implies that the static lin-
ear cointegration approach is not valid for exploring the unemployment-output tradeoff in the
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Eurozone.
Insert Table 1 and 2 here.
Considering the potential nonlinear properties of output shocks, the static asymmetric esti-
mation of the unemployment-output relationship is represented in Table 2. The equal positive
and negative asymmetric effects have been rejected for all economies in the Eurozone, except Ire-
land. This indicates that the spillovers from the changes in real outputs to unemployment rates
are asymmetrical. Only a few of EG statistics are significant at the 5% level, such as Germany,
Greece and Malta, which suggests the existence of the cointegration relation, but these models
suffer from serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. And also, the χ2RESET statistics indicate
that the nonlinear combination of the independent variables may have power in explaining the
dependent variable. This means that the potential long run relationship between unemployment
and output estimated by the static asymmetric regression might be unreliable. Interestingly,
the inclusion of the positive and negative asymmetric output shocks reduce the effects of two
dummies,10 which suggests that the unemployment-output tradeoff is more likely to be affected
by the cumulative asymmetric effects, rather than the spillovers from the financial crises.
5.2 Dynamic Linear Estimation of the Unemployment-Output Tradeoff
The above section has discussed the static modelling of the unemployment-output tradeoff, but
the results show that those models are misspecified. An intuition for improving this is the
extension of dynamic modelling. Based on Equation (7), the dynamic linear model form can
be obtained by imposing restrictions on the long run and short run asymmetric parameters:
θ+ = θ−, pi+t = pi−t .11 Table 3 reports the dynamic linear estimation of the relationship between
unemployment and output. As demonstrated in the table, a long run cointegration relationship
exists in France, Luxembourg, Netherland, Portugal, and Slovakia. The FPSS bounds tests have
10Compared with the static linear estimates, some of the dummy variables become insignificant in Table 2.
11The dynamic linear estimation of the unemployment-output is valid irrespective the integration order of the
variables, saying I(0), I(1) or mutually cointegrated, so this study did not test the stationarity of these series.
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been rejected in these economies, and the dynamic linear models are also correctly specified.
Although the long run unemployment-output tradeoffs have been found in Belgium, Estonia,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, and Spain, these models are severely
misspecified, which could be due to the asymmetric effects of output shocks on unemployment.
Among the identified unemployment-output relations, only the long run coefficients (Ly) are
negative and statistically significant in Estonia, Finland, Italy, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain,
which is generally consistent with the Okun’s law. While the long run coefficients are positive
in Austria, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, and Malta (without taking into account of the
significance of the long run coefficients), which are inconsistent with the conventional negative
Okun’s coefficient. For 7 out 17 countries the non-zero long run coefficients (Ly) have been
rejected, including Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, and Ireland, which
implies that the long run cointegration relationship between unemployment and output in these
economies might not exist, while the short run dynamics might exist. Quite a few long run
coefficients are larger than the previous findings in magnitude (Okun, 1962; So¨gner and Stiassny,
2002; Silvapulle et al., 2004; Perman and Tavera, 2005; Huang and Lin, 2006), such as Austria
and Italy, which could be due to the failure to accurately capture the long run correlation.
Insert Table 3 here.
Interestingly, the test of structural changes during crises periods has been rejected in many
economies.12 In the Eurozone, only four countries have structural changes during the great
recession, namely Germany, Ireland, Malta, and Spain. And four economies receive shocks since
the outbreak of the euro crisis in late 2009, which are Cyprus, Greece, Italy, and Slovenia. It
is apparent that the dynamic linear approach has improved the model accuracy compared with
the static models. Nevertheless, the diagnostic statistics and incorrect long run coefficients in
12This study includes two dummies (D1 and D2) in the dynamic linear estimation of the unemployment-output
relationship. Those insignificant short run parameters (including the dummies) are excluded from the final
estimation.
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some countries indicate that these models are still severely misspecified.
5.3 NARDL Modelling of the Unemployment-Output Tradeoff
The static linear estimates in above sections imply that the correlation between unemployment
and output might be asymmetric. Table 4 reports the dynamic asymmetric estimation of the
unemployment-output tradeoff. For 12 out 17 economies, the null hypothesis that the long run
coefficients are equal to zero (ρ = θ = 0) have been rejected, which indicates the existence
of long run correlation between unemployment and output.13 Among these correctly specified
models, the null of long run symmetric output effects have been rejected in Austria, Belgium,
Estonia, Italy, Malta, Slovakia, and Slovenia, whereas the null of short run symmetries are
accepted (except Belgium).14 It means that the responsiveness of unemployment to cyclical
output shocks in these countries are asymmetric in the long run but symmetric in the short run.
Without taking the model specifications into consideration, long run symmetries and short run
asymmetries exist in Germany, Ireland, and Portugal; short run asymmetry has been found in
Finland; and Greece has both long run and short run asymmetries. For other countries, both the
long run and short run relationship between unemployment and output are symmetric, namely
Cyprus, France, Luxembourg, and Netherland. Among them, only France does not show any
misspecification in the dynamic asymmetric estimation. It implies that the long run and short
run unemployment-output tradeoff are symmetric in France.
The estimated long run coefficients Ly+ and Ly− are -16.70 and -292.70 for Belgium, -20.59
and -36.84 for Estonia, -43.09 and -77.42 for Italy, respectively.15 Then we can conclude that
an economic upturn of 5.99% reduces unemployment by 1% in Belgium, while the downturn of
13The FPSS statistics are significant in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain, but the robustness tests demonstrate that four models are misspecified,
namely in the economy of Finland, Germany, Greece and Spain.
14In Belgium, both the null hypotheses of long run and short run symmetric effects have been rejected.
15In this context, only the correctly identified models which have long run asymmetry and significant long run
coefficients will be discussed.
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just 0.28% in the economy increases unemployment by 1%. In Estonia, on one hand, an increase
of 4.86% in the output reduces unemployment by 1%, on the other hand, a downturn of 2.7%
implies the opposite. Similarly, 2.32% growth in the Italian economy reduces its unemployment
by 1%, but 1.29% drop in the economy increases unemployment by 1%. The associated values
are -11.23 and -19.57 for Malta, -29.55 and -95.80 for Slovakia, -8.23 and -41.90 for Slovenia,
respectively. Therefore the values convert into an economic upturn of 8.90% and a downturn of
5.11% in Malta, an expansion of 3.38% and a reduction of 1.04% in Slovakia, a rise of 12.15% and
a decline of 2.38% in Slovenia, respectively. For Austria, only the negative long run coefficient
is significant, which suggests that an economic downturn of 1.27% increases unemployment by
1%. In the case of Belgium, both the long run and short run asymmetric effects have been
identified.16
Insert Table 4 here.
In Table 4, regardless of the model specifications, only 5 countries receive significant shocks
from the 2008 world financial crisis (D1) and 5 economies significantly suffer from euro crisis
(D2). Actually, the aftermath of two crises have significant effects on the Eurozone economies.
The discrepancies between empirical results (no significant shocks from the financial crises) and
the realities (these countries suffered from financial crises) could be due to the asymmetric effects
in the unemployment-output tradeoff. The labour market responds to the asymmetric output
shocks in a nonlinear pattern, which smooths or reduces the spillover effects during the financial
crises. When the output fluctuates, the disequilibrium relationship between unemployment and
output can be gradually calibrated over time by the adjustment of asymmetries in the dynamic
nonlinear model. In other words, the economy was plunged in to recession during the financial
crises and had been at the bottom of the business cycle. However, it could survive by the
implementation of appropriate structural reforms. Another reason could be the responsiveness
16The positive and negative short run asymmetry coefficients could be derived from the lagged ∆y+t−j and ∆y
−
t−j
.
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of the unemployment to the nonlinear combination of the explanatory variables (real outputs),
as indicated by the Ramsey RESET test.
5.4 Dynamic Multipliers
The dynamic multiplier represents the adjustments of unemployment-output tradeoff from its
initial equilibrium to the new equilibrium over time.17 It is associated with unit changes in
y+t and y−t on unt, respectively. Figure 2 presents the asymmetric dynamic multipliers for
the Eurozone economies. The curves combine the dynamic long run and short run asymmetry
shocks.18 Shade areas are the 90% confidence intervals. The imposed restrictions are in line
with the asymmetry tests in Table 4.19 Together with the diagnostic tests, the invalid long run
asymmetry restrictions endanger the identification of long run unemployment-output relations
and the estimation of dynamic multipliers, such as in Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal,
and Spain.
Insert Figure 2 here.
As the dynamic multipliers demonstrate, the labour markets respond rapidly and power-
fully to cyclical slump of outputs in the short run in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Italy, Malta,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Approximately, 60% of the disequilibrium could be corrected within 5
quarters, but the full adjustments towards new long run equilibrium take very long time. In-
tuitively, the unemployment-output relationship is symmetric in Malta, which might be due to
its strategic location, being situated in the middle of the Mediterranean Sea.20 Other countries
demonstrate the existence of asymmetric effects in the unemployment-output tradeoff, which
17The initial equilibrium in this context is the stable unemployment-output relationship. The relationship becomes
unstable after receiving a shock, but it could be adjusted toward to the new equilibrium by implementing
appropriate structural reforms.
18In this study, the long run and short run symmetry restrictions are β+ = β− and
∑q−1
i=0 pi
+
t =
∑q−1
i=0 pi
−
t ,
respectively.
19 Some models are misspecified in Table 4, but the long run and short run asymmetry restrictions are still carried
out to get the impression of the cumulative effect of cyclical output on unemployment.
20Geographical conditions are of importance for the development of productivity among member states (Nore´n,
2011).
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are either dominated by a positive output shock or negative output shock. For the two largest
economies in the region, the dynamic multipliers for Germany and France are almost represent-
ing symmetric output shocks across all time periods, except the very short run (1-2 quarters).
Although the unemployment-output tradeoffs are symmetric for the two economies in the long
run, the dynamic multipliers indicate that the short run asymmetric relationships are asym-
metric.21 Concerning Spain, the negative shock is almost constant and the correction of the
disequilibrium is dominated by the positive shock, irrespective of the model misspecification.
Around the second quarter, the asymmetric effect reaches the peak after a strong positive out-
put shock. Noticing that 50% of the disequilibrium could be adjusted either within one quarter
or ten quarters, other economies, such as Luxembourg and Portugal, the multipliers are in a
terrible mess due to the misidentified long run unemployment-output tradeoffs.
Insert Table 5 here.
Since the incorrect asymmetry restrictions could jeopardise the identification of the long run
relationship and affect the dynamic multipliers (Shin et al., 2014), we need to further confirm
the dominance of the output shocks. Thus, Table 5 reports the comparison of positive and
negative output shocks. The cumulative effects of positive and negative output shocks are not
the same size. Despite the cumulative positive output shocks are larger and more probable
than the cumulative negative shocks in Austria, Belgium, Finland, and France, the average size
of the two types of shocks are almost equal. The remaining countries show the dominance of
cumulative negative output shocks, which are more likely to happen in the unemployment-out
correlation. In line with the depicted dynamic multipliers, the asymmetric effects are dominated
by negative shocks in Greece, Italy, Netherland, Portugal, Slovakia, and Slovenia. This indicates
that the labour markets quickly respond to the economic downturn. The employers speedily lay
21In Table 4, the dynamic asymmetric estimation of the unemployment-output tradeoff in France suggests that
both the long run and short run correlation are symmetric. However, the cumulative output shocks on unem-
ployment are asymmetric in the short run.
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off employees in order to cut costs during recession, howbeit, they are slow to hire. This is
explained as the hysteresis in the labour market. The probable positive and negative shocks do
not demonstrate significant disparities in Austria, Belgium, Finland, and France. Moveover, the
dynamic multipliers show the dominance of negative shocks. This could be the case that the sum
of both the short run and long run shocks supports the dominance of negative shocks. Other
reasons might be the misspecified models since some variables are not statistically significant in
the dynamic asymmetric model.
5.5 Labour Market Reforms Analysis
In conjunction with the labour market reforms, we turn to the simple analysis of the effectiveness
of the identified asymmetric unemployment-output relationship. Since the outbreak of the world
financial crisis in 2008, the German government implemented four types of supply-side policies
in the same year, including three career-oriented programs for reducing structural unemploy-
ment and cyclical unemployment, and the permanent increase in working hours for municipal
employees. The duration of these measures were two to three years, which had helped to adjust
the asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff toward new equilibrium. While the dynamic
multiplier demonstrates that the disequilibrium could be fully corrected within 5 quarters (ir-
respective the model misspecification). When the long run relationship returns to normal, the
remaining and continuous structural reforms are helpful in stabilizing the unemployment-output
tradeoff. Therefore, the labour market reforms in Germany are effective and successful among
time. With regard to France, training and unemployment benefits were given to employees dur-
ing financial crisis. The measures of increasing minimum wage and allowing financial payments
instead of days off work also were carried out. In line with the identified long run and short run
symmetric unemployment-output relationship, these reforms were enough to correct the short
run disequilibrium (around one quarter), which might further reduce the effect of negative out-
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put shocks. Thus, we could say that these measures were functional and powerful. In terms of
Spain, there were two temporary labour tax reduction measures adopted by the Spanish govern-
ment during the crisis. These reforms did not fundamentally give incentives to the unemployed
and get them back to work. Moreover, these measures failed to adjust the disequilibrium to new
equilibrium within certain periods, the asymmetric effects became wider and deeper. Added to
that, policymakers could not implement effect reforms to get people into work without recog-
nising the asymmetry determinants. This could be one of the reasons for interpreting the high
rates of long term unemployment in Spain.22 Therefore, further investigation of the asymmetry
determinants is of importance for policymakers to carry out effective policies.
5.6 Cross-Sectional Analysis of Asymmetry Determinants
The NARDL estimates and the dynamic multipliers represent the asymmetric effects of labour
markets responding to the cyclical changes in outputs. We now turn to interpret the cross-section
variation of long run asymmetries.
Insert Table 6 here.
Due to the unavailability of the minimum wage data for some countries, such as Cyprus,
Finland, and Italy, we first run multivariate regression by including minimum wage variable
with the three countries excluded. Considering the bias of small sample, we run the bootstrap
regression to get the standard error of LRasyi , then estimate Equation (9) by weighting each
observation using the inverse of the standard error (column 3). As demonstrated in Table 6,
tax rate, government deficit/surplus, industrial production and foreign trade are associated with
long run asymmetries. Minimum wage and labour cost exhibit little correlation with the long
run asymmetric unemployment-output relationships.
The results above show that exports widen the asymmetric effects. This means that if
22Noticing that the misspecified NARDL model for Spain does not indicate the existence of asymmetric effects,
which could be due to the regional disparities in productivity growth in Spain (Villaverde and Maza, 2009).
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member states are export-driven growth, the asymmetric unemployment-output relationship
becomes stronger. It seems reasonable to suggest that reducing the dependence on export-
driven growth could reduce the asymmetric effects. The evidence also reveals that imports have
a negative impact on the asymmetric effects. Notice that the coefficient for CPI is significant in
the multivariate regression, which suggests that a higher inflation could widen the asymmetric
unemployment-output relationship as well. However, the increase of prices for domestic goods
and services might lead to the increase of imports, which in return reduces asymmetries. Further,
The increase of tax rate and industrial production may reduce the magnitude of long run asym-
metries, but the results from weighted regression do not support this. Moreover, government
deficit/surplus exhibit strong negative correlation with long run asymmetries. This implies that
increasing government spending is also helpful in correcting the disequilibrium unemployment-
output relationship. If the minimum wage variable is excluded, the results are consistent with
the former estimates.
The cross-sectional analysis of asymmetry determinants shows that government budget and
trade situation are the key factors influencing the asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff.
The increase of government spending could stimulate domestic consumption, and further leads
to the upturn of domestic goods prices and industrial production. The growth of industrial
production can expand exports to some extent. Our study also supports the evidence from
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2011) that, fiscal reforms can be used to fight these asymmetries,
and supply-side policies, like labour market reforms, are just additional tools that can be applied
in certain circumstances, since most structural reforms take some time before having an effect.
However, notice that since the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has outlined maximum limit
for government deficit and debt,23 member states have more incentives to appropriately modify
fiscal policy to make up the potential government debts. The implication of fiscal consolidation,
23The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a set of rules designed to ensure that member states in the Eurozone
seek sound public finances and adjust their fiscal policies.
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such increasing government spending and taxes, is also suggested by Anderson et al. (2014)
and Frankel (2015). Moreover, the SGP with its reliance on deficit targets are insufficient to
achieve fiscal stabilisation, replacing the deficit target by an expenditure target could also reduce
negative growth effects Bru¨ck and Zwiener (2006), which further reduce asymmetric effects in
the unemployment-output relationship.
6 Concluding Remarks
This study has investigated the asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff in the Eurozone using
the NARDL approach. Initially, the static linear, static asymmetric and dynamic linear models
fail to explain the long run tradeoff between unemployment and output due to severe model
misspecifications. Nonetheless, the NARDL estimates conclude that a long run relationship
between unemployment and output exists in some Eurozone economies, yet majority of them
are subject to asymmetric effects. The long run relationship between unemployment and output
are found in 12 Eurozone economies, where 7 of them suffer from asymmetric effects. Only
in Belgium, both the long run and short run unemployment-output correlation are found to
be asymmetric. With respect to the two largest economies in the region, we find evidence
of short run asymmetry in Germany, while both the long run and short run unemployment-
output tradeoff are symmetric in France. For the remaining countries, the diagnostic tests
suggest the misspecifications of these models. Possible solution could be the data denoising,
which might provide more accurate estimates (Jammazi et al., 2015). Interestingly, the NARDL
model fails in capturing structural instabilities during the two major crises, since the long run
and short run asymmetric effects alleviate or reduce the effects of the financial crisis in the
dynamic nonlinear model. Furthermore, majority of these dynamic multipliers show that the
labour markets respond quickly and strongly to the cyclical output downturns in the short run.
Commonly, 60% of the disequilibrium could be adjusted within 5 quarters although the fully
24
correction takes very long time (more than 20 quarters). These asymmetric effects are mainly
dominated by negative output shocks. In spite of the discrepancies of asymmetries, our findings
on the asymmetric unemployment-output tradeoff have important policy implications for labour
market reforms. In conjunction with the probable and size of asymmetries, structural reforms
could be carried out in keeping with the effects of asymmetry determinants.
In order to explain the size of identified long run asymmetries, we estimate the asymme-
try determinants by fitting multivariate regressions. The findings suggest that government
deficit/surplus and foreign trade situations are the key factors influencing the asymmetric
unemployment-output relationships. To reduce the asymmetric effects, member states may
consider increasing government spending and adjust their trade situations (reducing the depen-
dence on export-driven growth). Since the SGP has outlined maximum limit for government
deficit and debt among member states, hence, flexible application of fiscal reforms, such as in-
creasing spending and taxes,24 could help to reduce the asymmetric effects notwithstanding the
fact that countries in the euro area lack monetary sovereignty.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rates and real outputs in the eurozone
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Figure 2: The unemployment-output tradeoff dynamic multipliers
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Table 5: Comparison of positive and negative output shocks
N(y+t ) Pr(y+t ) Σy+t y¯+t
∏
y+t N(y−t ) Pr(y−t ) Σy−t y¯−t
∏
y+t
Austria 55 0.743 0.456 0.008 0.006 19 0.257 -0.114 -0.006 -0.002
Belgium 67 0.858 0.389 0.006 0.005 11 0.141 -0.057 -0.005 -0.000
Cyprus 38 0.644 0.359 0.009 0.006 21 0.356 -8.378 -0.399 -0.142
Estonia 47 0.797 0.853 0.018 0.014 12 0.203 -8.709 -0.726 -0.148
Finland 68 0.694 0.668 0.010 0.007 30 0.306 -0.292 -0.010 -0.003
France 96 0.813 0.598 0.006 0.005 22 0.186 -0.063 -0.003 -0.000
Germany 65 0.684 0.446 0.007 0.005 29 0.305 -6.685 -0.231 -0.070
Greece 36 0.545 0.436 0.012 0.007 30 0.455 -11.132 -0.371 -0.169
Ireland 47 0.662 0.956 0.020 0.013 24 0.338 -11.043 -0.460 -0.156
Italy 44 0.587 0.237 0.005 0.003 31 0.413 -13.024 -0.420 -0.174
Luxembourg 41 0.695 0.585 0.014 0.010 18 0.305 -9.343 -0.519 -0.158
Malta 41 0.695 0.587 0.014 0.010 18 0.305 -14.670 -0.815 -0.249
Netherland 55 0.733 0.415 0.008 0.006 19 0.253 -12.062 -0.635 -0.161
Portugal 54 0.684 0.400 0.007 0.005 25 0.316 -10.825 -0.433 -0.137
Slovakia 59 0.881 0.771 0.013 0.011 8 0.119 -10.003 -1.250 -0.149
Slovenia 61 0.813 0.619 0.010 0.008 14 0.186 -8.887 -0.635 -0.118
Spain 53 0.671 0.602 0.011 0.008 26 0.329 -8.042 -0.309 -0.102
Note: N(y+t ) and N(y−t ) designate the numbers of positive and negative output shocks, respectively. Pr(y+t )
and Pr(y−t ) represent the probability of positive and negative output shocks, respectively. Σy+t and Σy−t are
the cumulative effects of positive and negative shocks, respectively. y¯+t and y¯−t are the average size of positive
and negative shocks, separately.
∏
y+t and
∏
y+t designate the probable size of positive and negative shocks,
respectively. Source: authors’ calculation.
Table 6: Measuring asymmetry determinants
Multivariate reg. Weighted reg. Multivariate reg. Weighted reg.
Tax rate -1.950∗ -0.030 -2.487∗∗ -0.045
(0.834) (0.029) (0.778) (0.087)
Minimum wage -5.516 -0.369
(21.469) (1.071)
Labour cost -2.244 -0.088 -1.425 -0.203
(7.249) (0.386) (2.777) (0.307)
Government deficit/surplus -10.336∗∗ -0.319∗∗ -7.605∗∗∗ -0.245∗∗∗
(2.588) (0.157) (2.269) (0.050)
Industrial production -3.260∗∗ -0.085 -3.113∗∗∗ -0.178
(1.046) (0.055) (0.628) (0.305)
CPI 4.391 0.153 4.093∗∗∗ 0.248
(2.641) (0.141) (0.780) (0.382)
Imports %of GDP -3.682∗∗ -0.109∗∗ -3.271∗∗∗ -0.084∗
(1.234) (0.053) (0.956) (0.039)
Exports %of GDP 2.289∗ 0.084∗ 2.431∗∗∗ 0.024
(1.087) (0.045) (0.824) (0.077)
Note: The dependent variable is the degree of long run asymmetry (LRasyi ). Column 2 and 4 report the
simple multivariate regression results. Column 3 and 5 represent the results of weighted regression. We weight
each observation by the inverse of the standard error of LRasyi from the bootstrap regression in the first stage,
then the betas receive a heavier weight in the second stage (Doidge et al., 2006). As the minimum wage data
are not available for some countries, we estimate equation (9) by excluding those countries (column 2 and
3) and excluding the variable (column 4 and 5), respectively. ***, ** and * designate the rejection of null
hypotheses at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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